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NOTES AND COMMENTS
STATE TAXATION OF MULTISTATE BUSINESSES
PROBLEMS of discriminatory state taxation of multistate business have long
plagued the courts, and have recently been a subject of special congressional
study.' The courts have frequently confronted "vertical"2 discriminations -
differential treatment by a single state of its local and multistate taxpayers. The
House study gives limited attention to this vertical problem, but seems more
concerned with achieving "horizontal" uniformity - uniform treatment of
multistate taxpayers by each of the states. 3 This indiscriminate quest for hori-
zontal uniformity is heedless of the severe inroads upon state taxing powers
which it entails. In part, the House Report's lack of discrimination results from
inadequate recognition that some horizontal uniformities are useful only to pre-
vent vertical discriminations. The failure of recognition, in turn, causes the
House Report to ignore the full dimensions of the problem of vertical discrimi-
nation. This Note will suggest that the problems discussed in the House Re-
port should be solved with means more moderate than horizontal uniformity.
The Report's undue emphasis upon horizontal considerations is best indi-
cated by its apportionment proposal. The legislation proposed by the House
Report would establish a uniform method for dividing the multistate taxpayer's
tax base among states with jurisdiction to tax.4 At present, states not only use
1. Special Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Stale Taxation of Inter-
state Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as
HousE Rmxonr]. The House subcommittee was authorized to examine "all matters per-
taining to the taxation of interstate commerce by the States... :' Public Law 86-272
73 Stat. 555 (1959), as amended, Public Law 87-17, 75 Stat. 41 (1961), (the background
of which is related in HousE REPOR, voL 1, 7-9). But, for practical reasons, it delimited
the scope of its study, focusing upon state income and retail sales and use taxation, and
upon incorporated multistate taxpayers. Id. at 14-18. More precisely, its emphasis was
upon state income taxation. E.g., id. at 591-99. The remainder of this Note will adopt a
similar perspective in order to facilitate comparison with the House Report. But many
of the problems to be discussed, and the solutions to be proposed, apply to state taxation
of multistate taxpayers generally - regardless of the kind of tax imposed, the form in
which the multistate taxpayer operates, or the sort of economic activity in which such
a taxpayer is engaged.
2. The "vertical"-"horizontal" distinction has not been applied previously in this
context, but is believed to be a useful tool of analysis.
3. Perhaps this predisposition of the House subcommittee - which focuses primarily
upon state income taxation of multistate taxpayers, supra note 1 - is accounted for in
part by the existence of a counterpart horizontal statute at the federal level. And it also
may be due to a tendency to view the states' taxation of multistate taxpayers in terms of
a horizontal "system" of state taxation - a perspective which de-emphasizes that "the
system" is merely an abstraction from the taxing systems of particular states. E.g., Houss
REPORT, voL 1, at 598.
4. See HousE REPORT, vol. 1, at 521, 521-63 (summarized at 560-63), 595-99; compare
id. at 129-33. And see Developments in the Law - Federal Limitations on State Taxation
of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953, 977 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments in the Law].
The wholly local taxpayer is taxed by his state upon 100% of its total tax base. The
function of the states' apportionment formulas is to determine what portion of the multi-
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different methods of allocation - separate accounting, specific allocation and
formula apportionment - but also the formulation of each method varies with
the state.5 Since a state can choose the method most favorable to itself, this
diversity might subject a multistate taxpayer to cumulative taxation on more
than 100 per cent of its tax base.0 The proposed uniform standard would allow
a state to tax only the portion of the tax base which is "fairly attributable" to
it, thus limiting cumulative taxation to 100 per cent of the taxpayer's base.7
This uniformity is desirable only as a means of preventing vertical discrimi-
nations.8 Concern with the cumulative effects of divergent apportionments is
better understood in terms of a discrimination against the multistate taxpayer
by a particular taxing state. When the state apportions to itself an unduly high
state taxpayer's total tax base should be taxed by particular states, to "relate the tax-
payer's presence within the State to his presence everywhere." HousE RproRT, vol. 1, at
168. The apportionment formula determines what part of the taxpayer's total net income
is taxable by a particular state by reference to the proportions of selected aspects of the
taxpayer's total business which are connected with that state. Three general aspects, or
"factors," are available for use by the states: property, payroll and sales. Id. at 168-70,
"[E]ach factor is expressed as a fraction, with the numerator representing dollar value
within the State and the denominator dollar value everywhere." Id. at 168. Where a
single-factor formula is employed by the taxing state, the portion of the taxpayer's total
net income attributable to that state is determined by multiplying total net income by the
ratio or fraction yielded by comparing the value, for example, of the taxpayer's in-state
property with that of its total property. Similarly, where a multiple-factor formula is
used, the apportionment ratio to be applied against total net income consists of the sum
of the fractions yielded by analysis of each factor averaged by dividing that sum by the
number of factors employed.
5. See Housa REroRT, vol. 1, 153-249 (summarized at 246-49). For a discussion of
separate accounting and specific allocation, methods rejected by the House Report in
favor of formula apportionment, see citations supra note 4.
6. See Developments in the Law, 965-66, 1013; Harriss, Interstate Apportionninllt of
Business Income, 49 Am. Eco. REv. 398, 399-400 (1959); HouSE REORT, vol. 1, 389,
414-16. As the House Report points out, this diversity also might produce cumulative
taxation on less than 100% of the multistate enterprise's tax base.
It should be noted that the courts have not acted to eliminate diversity among the
states' methods of dividing income; rather, they sustain a variety of approaches so long
as each is somehow deemed fair. This limited judicial role, however, is appropriate. See
HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 160, and citations therein.
7. Cf. HousE REPORT, vol. 1 at 246. Put more broadly, such a standard would fix
cumulative taxation, both actual and potential, at no more (and no less) than 100%, of
the multistate enterprise's tax base. A uniform formula would attribute portions of the
multistate taxpayer's total net income to all states with which the taxpayer had the con-
nections deemed relevant by Congress. Some of those states might not impose a tax, at
present thirty-seven states plus the District of Columbia levy a corporate income tax.
HOUSE REPORT, vol. 1, 255-56, nn. 1-3. That they do or do not should be irrelevant to the
operation of the uniform formula. See note 10 infra; cf. HousE REPoRT, vol. 1, 389, 390,
414-15. The function of an apportionment formula is to determine to what extent a state
may tax the multistate taxpayer if it wishes to do so.
8. In this Note, the term "vertical discrimination" will be used not in its generic
sense, but to refer only to discriminations against multistate taxpayers. "Reverse vertical
discrimination" will refer to discriminations against wholly local taxpayers
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share of the multistate enterprise's tax base, the state effectively taxes the por-
tion of that base "fairly attributable to" it at a higher rate than it imposes upon
his wholly domestic counterpart.9 Indeed, cumulative taxation on more than
100 per cent of the tax base injures the multistate taxpayer only through this
kind of single-state vertical discrimination.10
Although the House Report fails to recognize the vertical implications of its
apportionment proposal, it proposes other horizontal uniformities in part to
prevent vertical discrimination. The Report criticizes a variety of discrimina-
tory deduction provisions commonly employed by the states - "[t]he allow-
ance of an extra depreciation deduction on in-State property, the allowance of
charitable contributions only if made to local donees, and the allov.,ance of an
intercorporate dividend deduction only if the paying corporation is taxed in
the State." 1 The Report would eliminate these discriminations by imposing
uniform and nondiscriminatory deduction provisions on all the states' - This
9. Both the House Report and the commentators recognize, of course, that there
is something discriminatory about the multistate taxpayer, unlike the single-state tax-
payer, being taxed upon more or less than 100% of its tax base. But they do not recognize
that this cumulative sort of discrimination becomes concrete only through a correlative
vertical discrimination by a single taxing state. See HoUSE REoir, vol 1, at 389, 414-16,
and cf., id. at 157; see Developments in the Law at 965-66, 1013.
10. Cf., Synposium on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 T.,N-N. L. REv.
239, 242 (1960). It should now be clear why the uniform apportionment formula must
attribute portions of the multistate taxpayer's total tax base to all states with which the
taxpayer has the relevant connections, whether or not those states impose the tax in
question. See note 7 supra. Modifying a uniform apportionment formula by attributing
portions of the tax base not to all states with which the multistate taxpayer has the rele-
vant connections but only to those states which impose the tax in question would permit
the very vertical discriminations which the horizontally uniform formula was designed
to prevent. In each of the states which imposes the tax, the multistate taxpayer will be
taxed upon a tax base in excess of that "fairly attributable to" that state, and thus at
a higher rate than is imposed upon his local competitors in that state. Alternatively, the
vertical discrimination can be conceptualized as occurring in the state which could tax,
but chooses not to do so. That state in effect taxes its multistate and local taxpayers
at the rate of 0%. If the excess taxes paid to the taxing states because of the unfair
attribution are viewed as being borne in the state which might have taxed but did not,
then the multistate taxpayer is taxed at a rate above 0% there. However conceptualized,
an apportionment formula modified in the manner described would effect a rate discrimi-
nation against the multistate taxpayer in one of the states to which some of his total
tax base was fairly attributable.
11. HoUsE REPORT, vol. 1, 588.
12. Id. at 587-90. It is unclear whether the proposal would impose horizontal uni-
formity with respect to all aspects of the tax base or merely to the particular deductions
discussed in the House Report. The alternatives are said to "vary from complete con-
formity to very limited substantive restriction." Id. at 590. The particular discriminatory
deduction provisions cited in the Report are apparently cited only as examples of "pro-
visions under which the deductibility of an item turns upon the occurrence of an event
within the taxing State." Id. at 588. Since, in theory, any deduction provision can be so
drafted, that class might include all deduction provisions. And in practice, horizontal
uniformities employed to prevent vertical discriminations would be futile if the states were
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proposal would severely interfere with state taxing powers by preventing them
from employing their existing power to define tax bases in order to accom-
plish revenue or regulatory objectives.13 Such interference is unnecessary in
view of the judicial doctrine that vertical discriminations against multistate
taxpayers violate the interstate commerce clause. 14 Reliance on this doctrine
would remedy discrimination without curtailing the states' authority to define
tax bases in any non-discriminatory manner.
The House Report suggests that horizontal uniformity of tax bases would
not only eliminate vertical discriminations, but would also simplify multistate-
taxpayer compliance with states' tax statutes.15 While such taxpayers would
surely find it simpler to work with a uniformly defined tax base, the benefits
of simplicity seem foo slight to justify this interference with state taxing
powers. As the House Report itself recognizes, "it does not seem probable that
the costs induced by differences in the definition of taxable income present a
significant burden to many companies today."'16 Moreover, a measure short of
uniform definitions of fixed content would greatly simplify compliance without
restriction upon state taxing powers. Congress could require all states to adopt
the "moving Federal base - that is, a definition of taxable income which be-
gins with the Federal figure" - and to explicitly enumerate those respects in
which the state base departs from the federal one.17 While a requirement of
uniform but "moving" tax bases would entail state revision of tax statutes,
the states' taxing powers would remain intact. The states would be free to
make departures from the uniformly defined tax base so long as those depar-
tures were enumerated. This "uniformity of form" would not simplify com-
pliance as much as would fixed or "substantive" uniformity,18 since differences
among state definitions of tax base would persist. But it would eliminate the
primary source of difficulty and expense in complying with various definitions
left free to manipulate any deduction provision, or indeed the tax rate itself. Therefore, If
vertical discriminations were sought to be prevented by the use of horizontal uniformities
given nondiscriminatory content, all aspects of the tax base, and the tax rate, might be
made horizontally uniform. Accord, id. at 583.
13. The House Report implicitly recognizes that its proposal would be "fincon-
sistent with the State power to formulate tax policy." HousE RErowr., vol. 1, at 589-00,
14. See text accompanying notes 63-78 infra; but note that Congress must strengthen
enforcement of this doctrine. A congressional requirement of vertical uniformity might
be applied to all aspects of the tax base and to tax rates as well. Perhaps the House
Report was referring to this alternative solution to the problem of vertical discriminations
when it stated:
Although the prevention of discrimination against multistate taxpayers might be
achieved without a requirement that the States conform to the Federal definition
of taxable income, it would be at least an incidental benefit of conformity. [Empha-
sis added.]
HOUSE REPoRT, vol. 1, at 588.
15. Id. at 583-87, 589-90.
16. Id. at 585.
17. Id. at 589-90.
18. Id. at 590. Only "substantive" horizontal uniformity is, in fact, horizontal uniforludy.
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- determining the respects in which the states' tax bases differ.10 The House
Report has considered the use of horizontally uniform but "moving" tax bases
only in the area of state income taxation, apparently because the federal income
tax statute provides the needed horizontally uniform definition.O But the mov-
ing-base approach could be used to simplify the system of multistate taxation
even when no similar federal tax exists. Congress need only establish uniform
tax bases to serve as prototypes.
Beyond questions of desirability, the proposals for horizontal uniformity
raise serious constitutional doubts. Since Congress has never imposed such far-
reaching restrictions on state taxing powers, the constitutional question is open:
to what extent may Congress infringe upon state tax powers under the author-
ity to regulate interstate commerce?21
In his definitive examination of federal systems, Wheare stresses that one
must "distinguish the taxing power from other legislative powers. Its nature is
different. It is the power to raise means, [not] to regulate specific fields." He
concludes that federal powers "must not be used so as to deny to the states
the... power to provide the means by which they are to carry out the func-
tions which are left to them in the constitution."2- This principle was neglected
by neither the framers nor the elaborators of the Constitution. In the Fed-
eralist papers, even Hamilton argued that state taxing powers could be sub-
jected to no congressional restriction whatever.m In Gibbons v. Ogden Mar-
shall recognized that "the power of taxation is indispensable to [the states']
existence. '24 Although Marshall was referring primarily to the states' need for
revenue, effective governance by the states requires use of the taxing power
for nonrevenue purposes also. The states' power to tax has always been seen
in the same light as the federal power - a power to be used for any govern-
19. Id. at 583-84, 589-90.
20. Cf. id. at 278-79. Compare note 3 supra.
21. The question treated here involves congressional authority to restrict state taxing
powers against the will of the states. Were the states willing to give up certain of their
taxing powers in return for federal grants-in-aid, this would seem unobjectionable, at
least if they were assured independent access to obligatory federal grants unconditioned
as to use. Cf., HA~xN , FnaAxcE AN TAXATioN, EssAYs ON THE AuSTRAIM.n Co, s -rr-
TioN, 247 (2d ed. 1961) for an analysis of the somewhat analogous Australian experience.
22. WHEARE, Fxnaax GovERIthENT 107-08 (4th ed. 1963). And see id. at 93.
23. THE FEDERALST No. 32, at 249 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Hamilton). A premise of
his absolutist argument was that, in the absence of congressional action, the states possess
taxing powers under the constitution except to the extent expressly restricted in that
document. Id. at 251-52. This intermediate position is well settled today. E.g., Hellerstein
& Hennefeld. State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HAv. I REv. 949, 951-54
(1941), noting especially nn. 7-11 and accompanying text. But these authors take the
further position that, when Congress regulates state taxation of interstate commerce,
"the constitutional picture changes completely; then any tax inconsistent with the con-
gressional action is invalid by reason of the grant of supremacy to Congress." Id. at 953.
This position assumes, however, that there are no constitutional limits upon congressional
power to regulate state taxation.
24. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824).
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mental purpose2 5 Taxing powers enable the state to regulate private conduct,
to fix the relative sizes of the state and private sectors, and to finance state-
selected programs.
However, it is a commonplace that congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce is virtually unlimited. Within the context in which this assertion is
usually made, it is quite accurate. Since the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, Con-
gress' commerce power has been defined as one to regulate those "branch[es]
of trade" which themselves constitute or affect "commercial intercourse" among
the states.2 6 And Congress may today regulate many sectors of the national
economy previously deemed to be wholly "intrastate" and without substantial
effect upon interstate commerce. In sustaining broad assertions of the com-
merce power, however, the courts have stressed the interstate nature of the
activity regulated, and have not emphasized the state power displaced or re-
stricted.27 This emphasis is necessary when Congress attempts a broad inter-
ference with the state taxing power, a power essential to the capacity to govern.
New constitutional doctrine must be fashioned to protect state taxing powers
from undue interference, without preventing Congress from accomplishing any
legitimate objectives.
Since Congress has no explicit power to regulate state taxation, any regu-
lation must be justified by both the commerce clause and the "necessary and
proper" clause.28 The oft-venerated exposition of the "necessary and proper"
clause was handed down by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which. are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.20
A brief inquest will suggest that these words should not have so long outlived
their author.
Marshall's formulation concludes his discussion of this question: to what
"extent '80 may Congress go beyond its enumerated powers by virtue of the
necessary and proper clause? The discussion begins by assuming its conclusion:
The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged various arguments, to
prove that this clause, though in terms a grant of power, is not so in effect;
but is really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be
implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers.81
25. See, e.g., Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 43, 47 (1934); United States
v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1950), relying explicitly upon Magnano.
26. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90, 193 (1824).
27. See, e.g., Houston, East and West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States (the Shreve-
port rate case), 234 U.S. 342, 349-55 (1914) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,, 301
U.S. 1, 29-32, 34-41 (1937). Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
28. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
30. Id. at 405,410.
31. Id. at 412.
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Thus, although the issue was the extent of congressional power under the
necessary and proper clause, Marshall avoided this question of degree and
focused instead on whether the clause constituted a "grant" of power, an issue
on which there was no disagreement. Then, after recognizing that Congress,
simply by implication from its enumerated powers, would have power to select
appropriate means of implementation, 3 2 he imposed upon the state the burden
of showing that the clause was not merely redundant. On this point, Marshall
seems to have relied on his intimate knowledge gained while framing the con-
stitution.
That this idea [broad authority to implement enumerated powers] was
entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be
inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from its languagezl
But while representing a majority of the Court, Marshall was apparently
among the dissenting framers.
[This idea] is also, in some degree, warranted by their having omitted to
use any restrictive term [such as necessary and proper?] which might
prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. 4
Although Marshall's circumratiocination cannot justify a generally broad
construction of the necessary and proper clause, a broad construction can be
justified in the particular context it appeared. Marshall's exegesis of the clause
is found in the section of his opinion relating to congressional power to estab-
lish a national bank, an implied power which would restrict no power of the
states.3 5 But the ultimate issue in McCifloch was whether the national bank
was immune from state taxation.30 Marshall avoided the question of whether
it was "necessary and proper" for a national bank to be immunized from state
taxation by posing the question in terms of constitutional immunity of a sov-
ereign 3 7 He elaborated no standard for the scope of implied congressional
powers which conflict with state powers.38 Marshall's broad construction of the
necessary and proper clause is confined on the facts of McCulloclh to those
situations in which congressional power is unlimited by principles of federal-
ism. Every analogy upon which he relies also suggests this limitation upon his
holding,39 as, for example, his compelling argument from the fact that Congress
32. In addition to the quotation accompanying note 31 supra, see id. at 405, 420.
33. Id. at 407.
34. Ibid. And see id. at 408, 420, for other statements of Marshall as framer.
35. Id. at 401-25.
36. Id. at 425.
37. Id. at 425-37. The congressional statute creating the national bank did not pur-
port to bestow upon it immunity from state taxation. Technically, then, Marshall was
free to pose the question as a constitutional one, not involving congressional powers under
the necessary and proper clause. In doing so. however, he chose to ignore the ultimate
derivation of the bank's immunity from the congressional statute creating the bank.
38. Even if Marshall was not required to elaborate the necessary and proper clause
in this context, supra note 37 and accompanying text, it is odd that he did not do so in
dictum. For he, above all, was mindful that he was "expounding" a constitutional pro-
vision for future generations and circumstances. Id. at 407, 415.
39. Id. at 416-18.
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has the power to punish for the breach of those laws which it has the power to
adopt.
[A] limited construction of the word "necessary" must be abandoned in
order to punish.... If the word "necessary" means "needful," "requisite,"
"essential," "conducive to," in order to let in the power of punishment for
the infraction of law; why is it not equally comprehensive when required
to authorize the use of means which facilitate the execution of the powers
of government without the infliction of punishment ?40
One reason which might be suggested is that "equally comprehensive means"
may sometimes impair the powers of the states, most crucially the power to tax.
Marshall did not neglect the critical importance of state taxing powers.4 ' He
recognized that the power to tax is also the power to survive. Indeed, he im-
plied that this power is virtually unlimited, except by the principle of sovereign
immunity.
It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is
essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately
exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to
which the government may choose to carry it... [Moreover] the power
of taxation is not confined to the people and property of a State. It may
be exercised upon [multistate taxpayers] ... The sovereignty of a State
extends to every thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced
by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed
by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the
people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it does not.
Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. They are given
by the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in
pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently,
the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend
over them.
42
While Marshall's broad formulation of the necessary and proper clause
should not be taken to permit undue congressional encroachments upon state
taxing powers, neither should his broad formulation of the states' power to tax
non-federal entities be taken to preclude Congress from ever regulating state
taxation of multistate enterprises. A flexible test, responsive to conflicting
claims of state and federal power, is demanded. The "necessary and proper"
clause provides such a test, if the words are construed strictly where the essen-
tial state power of taxation is involved. "Necessary" is an ambiguous word, as
Marshall himself recognized.4 3 What follows, however, is not that we must at-
tribute to it some fixed content, upon the questionable hypothesis that the
framers both foresaw the variety of situations to which the clause might be
applied and intended that the same meaning be given in all of them.44 Rather,
in the fashion of judges, we must particularize our construction of the clause,
40. Id. at 418.
41. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
42. Id. at 428-29.
43. Id. at 415.
44. Id. at 414-15, 419.
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giving it a meaning appropriate to the context. And in doing so, "we must
never forget, that it is a [federal] constitution we are expounding."
4 5
When state taxing powers and congressional interest in commerce conflict,
Congress should be constitutionally obligated to accomplish its objectives in
the way which least conflicts with state authority.40 It should not be permitted
to employ all "appropriate" means, but only those means "necessary" to its
purposes. This test requires that Congress have a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing the entire group affected by its legislation. Thus Congress could legislate
for all multistate taxpayers as a class only if its objectives permitted no finer
distinctions. Furthermore, the particular regulation imposed would have to be
narrowly tailored to the congressional purpose.
The House Report proposals affect the entire class of multistate taxpayers,
but this broad coverage would be constitutionally permissible. Whether the
proposals are necessary to prevent malapportionment of the multistate tax-
payers' tax bases, to simplify their compliance problems, or to protect them
from vertical discrimination, inclusion of the entire class is essential. However,
some of the particular regulations which the Report would apply to this class
pose more difficult constitutional problems.
The proposed uniform apportionment proposal is minimally restrictive of
state tax powers, and entirely consistent with the constitution. Since apportion-
ment formulas are used only with respect to multistate taxpayers, the proposal
would not affect state tax policies of general application. Moreover, the most
common effect of diverse state apportionment formulas is that of vertical dis-
crimination. No measure short of a horizontal uniform apportionment could
prevent the "cumulative" vertical discriminations which result from the diver-
sity.
47
The House Report suggestion of horizontally uniform tax bases is nol so
easily justified.48 The Report directs this proposal to two objectives: reduction
45. Id. at 407.
46. It might be argued that this strict, necessary and proper test, designed to
protect state taxing powers, might unduly prevent Congress from overriding state regula-
tory policies. Thus a state, recognizing the breadth of congressional authority to override
exercises of the police power, might add a tax to its regulatory scheme in the hope of
sheltering it from congressional action. This attempt, however, would be futile. If the
Congress could prevent implementation of the disapproved state policy only by striking
down the regulatory scheme and its enforcing tax, the strict necessary and proper test
would sustain the congressional action. On the other hand, if means short of striking
down the tax in its entirety were available - e.g., the removal of one of several conditions
upon which tax liability was dependent - the test would demand the use of the lesser
means. But the test proposed would never prevent Congress from accomplishing its
objective.
47. HousE REPoRT, voL 1, 588. For similar reasons, the Report's proposal to eliminate
the diversity now existing among the states' rules regarding timing of income and deduc-
tion items should be approved. Id. at 412-13, 588. See generally notes 4-10 mspra and ac-
companying text.
48. The Report itself is somewhat hesitant about the imposition of horizontal uni-
formities of fixed content in this area - noting that "[w]hile the desirability of uniform
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of compliance cost and elimination of vertical discrimination. The Report iden-
tifies the major source of compliance cost for the multistate taxpayer as the
cost of ascertaining the differences among state taxing bases. To the extent
that the Report's proposal is designed to reduce this cost, it is unnecessary.
Adoption of the moving federal base approach would greatly reduce this cost.
49
But the House Report may have proposed substantive base uniformity in order
to eliminate that cost entirely by removing the differences of definition.60 In
that case, a different question would be presented - whether the congressional
objective was sufficiently weighty to permit major infringement of state taxing
powers. While the "necessary and proper" test is not directly relevant to tile
weighing of congressional objectives (rather than means), the same state in-
terest is at stake and should be given commensurate respect. On the other
hand, the costs arising solely from the fact of differences among state defini-
tions - that is, those which arise after the relevant differences are known -
are admitted by the House Report to be insubstantial."' The second objective,
elimination of vertical discrimination, can be achieved by more narrowly tai-
lored congressional action.
52
While the federal interest in horizontal base uniformity is slight, the proposal
would likely involve a far greater interference with state taxing powers than
the Report reveals. For reasons of administrative feasibility, states may be re-
quired to adjust the tax base applicable to local taxpayers to match the multi-
state base. Indeed, this adjustment may be required by the equal protection
clause.53 In either case, the federal legislation would in effect fix tax bases
applied by the states to their local taxpayers.5 4 The House proposal is not
apportionment rules has been widely accepted, there has been a tendency to be somewhat
more concerned with State tax policies in the area of tax base." HousE REPORT, vol. 1 at
588. See also id. at 589. See generally notes 11-20 supra and accompanying text; Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Daughton, 262 U.S. 413, 422 n. 6 (1923).
49. See notes 16-19 sitpra and accompanying text.
50. It is not entirely clear whether this was among the purposes for which substantive
horizontal uniformity in the area of tax base was sought. See HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 583-
87, 589-90.
51. See id. at 583-84, and particularly text accompanying note 15 therein.
52. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. Cf. HouSE REPORT, vol. 1, at 589. But cf. Grayson
County State Bank v. Calvert, 357 S.W2d 160 (Civ. App. Tex. 1962).
54. It is arguable, moreover, that Congress might be required by the equal protection
requirement implicit in the fifth amendment, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954),
to assure that wholly local taxpayers will not suffer reverse vertical discriminations when
multistate taxpayers' bases are fixed. The consequence of either de facto or explicit exten-
sion of tax base uniformity to local taxpayers would be a congressional fixing of the tax
base applied by the states to their local taxpayers. Apart from such extensions, Congress,
in order to employ horizontal uniformity as a means of preventing vertical discrimination,
would at least have to fix, as the minimum base employed by the states for their local
taxpayers, that which it established for multistate taxpayers. Because substantive horizontal
base uniformity with respect to multistate taxpayers is unnecessary for the accomplishment
of any of the purposes mentioned by the House Report, its partial or complete extension
to local taxpayers would also be unnecessary.
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"necessary and proper" within the meaning of that phrase suggested above.'
Some commentators have made even more drastic proposals to eliminate
horizontal disuniformities. They argue that horizontal uniformity would enable
55. The analysis also raises serious questions as to the validity of proposed horizontally
uniform jurisdictional standards, HOUSE REPoRr, vol. 1, 481-516 (summarized at 513-16),
as well as those already in existence. Public Law 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (Supp. III, 1961). Both operate only to restrict admittedly constitu-
tional assertions of state taxing jurisdiction. See generally HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 11, 12.
The difficult questions involved have not been confronted by the Supreme Court. The de-
cisions sustaining the validity of Public Law 86-272 are inadequate. See Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314 (1964), cert. denied, XLVII Snermm's LA.
CrrATIoNs, No. 2 292 (1965). State ex rel. Ciba Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. State
Tax Commission, 382 S.W.2d 645 (1964). The proposed jurisdictional standard is said to
be necessary, in part, to provide clarity in the states' jurisdictional standards, thus improv-
ing both the levels of voluntary compliance and the possibilities of state enforcement.
HousE REPORT, voL 1, at 514, 489. Even if we assume that there is some congressional
interest under the commerce clause, in accomplishing these objectives, congressionally
imposed jurisdictional standards of fixed content are a means unnecessarily restrictive
of state taxing powers. Congress might enact a "moving" prototype jurisdictional standard,
from which the states would be free - within the bounds of due process - to depart so
long as those departures were explicitly enumerated. Cf. notes 17-19, 48-51 .supra and
accompanying text. Such a standard might include both qualitative and quantitative tests,
and the states might be compelled to employ both. See generally HOUSE REPORT, vol. 1,
489-513. When a multistate taxpayer contemplates operations within a state, he can as
easily consult that state's definition based upon the moving federal standard as he can
a fixed federal standard. Surely state enforcement officials can do the same.
The proposed standard is also said to be necessary to achieve consistency with the
proposed uniform apportionment formula, in order to assure that both pursue the same
"policy as to where income should be subject to income taxation!' HousE REPORT, vol. 1,
513. However, Congress has no authority to fix general policy regarding jurisdiction to
tax. Moreover, the uniform apportionment formula is desirable not to implement some
"policy" as to where income should be taxable, but rather to prevent vertical discrimina-
tions. See note 9 supra and citations therein, notes 4-10 supra and accompanying text. In
establishing a uniform apportionment formula, Congress will inevitably affect where in-
come is taxable. But this is only an incidental effect of a proposal necessary to prevent
vertical discriminations. See HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 560.
The proposed jurisdictional standard is finally said to be necessary because any appor-
tionment formula "will result in the attribution by some companies to some States of
very small proportions of their income." Id. at 513-14. The suggestion is that this "com-
pliance burden" is "undue." Ibid. As distinguished from other compliance costs with which
the HOUSE REPORT is concerned, see notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text, the "com-
pliance" costs of particular relevance to this proposal are only those incident to the filing
of returns and those reflecting payment of taxes. Id. at 488. The first of these costs is
inevitable, so long as there is state taxation; the second is not a "compliance" cost at all,
but is the product of compliance. The House Report's objectives are less ambitious. Its
concern is not with these costs as they affect all multistate taxpayers, but only as they
affect small multistate taxpayers. Id. at 514, 515, 505-06; cf., id. at 7. As to them, Congress
may have legitimate reasons for restricting state taxation. See note 62 infra. But if Con-
gress's legitimate concern is with this particular class of multistate taxpayers, it is neces-
sary, and therefore constitutional, to restrict state taxation of only this class. See para-
graph accompanying note 46 supra. Public Law 86-272, enacted for the legitimate purpose
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multistate taxpayers to allocate their resources among the states by reference
to market factors alone, without regard to varying tax burdens. Eliminating
these varying tax burdens would free the multistate taxpayer from "artificial"
considerations, and thus allow him to use his resources most efficiently. 0 While
not followed to this conclusion by its advocates, this logic would seem to require
not merely that all states apply identical rates to identically defined tax bases,
but that the states impose exactly the same kinds of taxes. Under the constitu-
tional test developed above, Congress might impose this broadest of horizontal
uniformities only if it accepted the theory that any tax difference among the
states is inefficient. But this theory misconceives the nature of state taxes.
State governments, like private businesses, vary in the extent to which they
provide an ample "return," in the form of government services, upon tax cost
"investment." 57 Some commentators have rejected the concept of a tax "re-
turn" because it is difficult to generalize about the benefits received by "the
average taxpayer."' 8 But from the perspective of each individual taxpayer, the
return varies depending on the state government involved. The individual tax-
payer can consider the states' varying returns as well as their differing tax
burdens when selecting states in which to operate.50 Thus horizontal disuni-
formity is not "artificial" to the extent that the state governments provide dif-
ferent services.60
of protecting small multistate enterprises, HousE REPORT, vol. 1, at 7, should be deemed
unconstitutional because its imprecise drafting has resulted in the insulation from state
taxation of enterprises of substantial size. Id. at 438-39. Compare BITrKER, FEDERAL INCOMI!
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 403 (student ed. 1963). Congress might
avoid this consequence in any new legislation by adding to its proposed restriction upon
state tax jurisdiction one qualification - that the restriction operate only with respect to
businesses below a specified size. But cf., HOUSE REPORT, vol. 1 at 510-11. See generally id.
at 481-516 (summarized at 513-16).
56. See, e.g., Maloon, Do State-Local Tax Structures Influence New Industry Loca.
tion?, 37 TAXES 635, 646 (1959). Cf. Developments in the Law at 1011, referring to the
"inequities which result from the diversity among the states with respect to tax rates
and tax bases."
57. See Sufrin, Tax Incentives and Industrial Location, 10 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 21, 23-26
(1958). Cf. Hellerstein & Hennefeld, supra note 23, at 968. As the Sufrin article suggests,
the return upon tax cost investment may include not only public services and facilities,
but also such things as labor stability, -which appears to vary directly with the level of
governmental services.
58. See Developments in the Law at 957.
59. See Sufrin, supra note 57.
60. The states to some extent impose higher levels of taxation not only because of
benefits attributable directly or indirectly to governmental activities, but also because of
the presence within their boundaries of assets of sufficient value to induce taxpayers to
pay the state for their use. See Developments in the Law at 968-69, but note that the
assertion there that this practice is a frequent one is inadequately documented and some-
what inconsistent with note 82 therein. Perhaps Congress should prevent the states from
imposing tax charges for benefits within their territory not attributable to the activities
of their governments as such charges impede access to these resources. Total horizontal
uniformity would be one way to prevent this practice, but it would seem to be a most
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While the states may vary in providing governmental services, both multi-
state and local taxpayers enjoy equally the benefits conferred by any single
state. Therefore a vertical discrimination against multistate businesses in the
tax burden imposed does not reflect economic return. Unlike horizontal dis-
uniformity, vertical disuniformity denies multistate taxpayers equal access to
local markets, causing misallocation in the national economy. Eliminating ver-
tical discrimination would free the economy from artificial restraints.0 ' Con-
gress should attend more seriously to these vertical problems, and should re-
quire vertical uniformity
2
inappropriate method. A variety of things within a state's boundaries may be of par-
ticular value at some times and not others, to some multistate taxpayers and not others.
If the taxes which reflect this practice are not of general application, but are imposed
upon the particular groups tapping the asset in question, as is suggested in Brown, The
Open Economy - Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Y,= LJ.
219, 232 (1957), the appropriate course for Congress would be to fix horizontally uniform
tax levels only for those taxes which are imposed upon the utilization of particular assets,
or perhaps only those assets of special interest to Congress. See note 62 infra. It would
seem to be most difficult to ascertain whether taxes of general application, e.g., an income
tax, reflected this practice to any extent, cf. Brown, supra this note, at 232. Were Congress
to undertake this inquiry - a prerequisite to any decision to impose horizontal uniformity
for generalized taxes in order to prevent this practice - it would have to consider to
what extent assets apparently unrelated to governmental activity are so related in fact.
For example, "productive skills," Developments in the Law at 969, might be attributable
to governmental service in the field of education. See Sufrin, supra note 57, at 24-25.
61. While the emphasis of this Note is upon vertical discriminations against multi-
state taxpayers, economic resources may be misallocated just as clearly by such discrimina-
tions in their favor. Multistate enterprises might be encouraged, by the prospect of tax
advantages over in-state competitors, to make entry into the markets of - or to locate
industrial facilities within - states which would not have been selected upon the basis
solely of market considerations. These reverse vertical discriminations as well would
be of legitimate concern to Congress under the Commerce Clause. That clause, while
concerned with interstate companies' access to state economies, is probably concerned
more fundamentally with the efficient allocation of the resources of interstate enterprises.
62. Particularized horizontal uniformity of tax level may be justifiable on economic
grounds; it might be employed to encourage the activity of classes of multistate taxpayers,
such as railroads or small businesses. It is also possible that the circumstances might call
for fixing the horizontally uniform level of taxation at the lowest possible level - i.e.,
immunity. Congress has constitutional power to require horizontal uniformity of tax
levels with respect to particular classes of multistate taxpayers in whom it has a legiti-
mate regulatory interest. See paragraph accompanying note 46 supra. Cf. Grayson County
State Bank v. Calvert, 357 S.W.2d 160 (Civ. App. Te. 1962), and I5 Stat. 34 (1863),
12 U.S.C. § 548(1) (b) (1958), which was involved therein.
The situation in which the multistate taxpayer has no local competition within the
taxing state illustrates the extent to which Congress for economic reasons may require
the states to employ horizontally uniform tax levels. It is true that heavy tax burdens -
which some may deem "excessive" - may be imposed upon the average multistate tax-
payer in this situation. See Developments in the Law at 971; but see the judicial rule id.
at 978-79. But the decision as to when tax burdens become "excessive" to multistate
taxpayers as a class cannot be resolved in the abstract by Congress. It can be made only
by the individual multistate taxpayer, which may choose - from the perspective of its
1965]
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Had Congress considered this direct solution, it would have found that the
courts have attempted to enforce vertical uniformity unaided by statute. Armed
only with the interstate commerce clause,03 they have proclaimed that vertical
discriminations against multistate taxpayers are unconstitutional. 04 But the
general rule has been undercut in several ways. In some cases, the courts
simply ignore the question of discrimination.65 In other cases only "unreason-
able" discriminations are proscribed ;66 and the "rule of reason" is accompanied
particular circumstances - to withdraw from or limit its operations in a taxing state
whose tax burdens it deems excessive. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text. The
general congressional interest in the level of state taxation which touches all multistate
taxpayers lies in the prevention of vertical discriminations, and not in the prevention of
"excessive" tax levels; the only generalized judgment regarding the excessiveness of a
state's tax burdens upon multistate taxpayers which Congress can make is that such
burdens are excessive to the extent that they exceed those imposed upon local competi-
tors. Cf. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 TENN. L. REv. 239, at 242 (1960).
By hypothesis, that general interest is absent in the situation posed. Congress may impose
horizontally uniform tax levels only for particular classes of multistate taxpayers or for
taxes which unduly restrict the use of particular assets. See note 60 supra; Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
63. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
64. See, e.g., West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, Ala., 354 U.S,
390, 392 (1957); I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U. S. 113, 119-20
(1908); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1879); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275 (1875). Cf. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 407-99 (1887),
in which the fact of discrimination was not considered decisive because of the Court's
adherence to the view that "interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all. . . ." As is con-
ceded by the Court, id. at 499, the practical and logical consequence of this position was
to vertically discriminate against local taxpayers by conferring a sheltered status upon
their multistate competitors. This view, in part because of such consequence, was re-
jected in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452, 461-
62 (1958), if not earlier, HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 7.
65. In these cases, the critical question from the viewpoint of a policy against
vertical discriminations - as to which of the local businesses is in competition with the
multistate competitor - seems not to have been considered at all. See, e,.1., Caskey Baking
Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941) (in which the court never inquired as to
whether the multistate taxpayer competed primarily with local peddlers subject to taxa-
tion or with exempted local manufacturers); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) ;
General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367 (1926). The decisions cited are
"multiple-statute" cases, involving a state argument that the apparently discriminatory
tax provision is nondiscriminatory when viewed in conjunction with other statutes. In
such cases, particularly when different kinds of taxes are imposed upon local and multistate
taxpayers, the appropriate way to compare the taxes involved would seem to be, first, to
isolate the multistate taxpayer's local competitor(s), and then to compare the burdens
which would be imposed by the applicable taxes upon each if they and their operations
were of identical size.
66. The courts have not articulated a standard of reasonableness by which to evaluate
vertical discriminations. See Hellerstein & Hennefeld, supra note 23, at 965. But in light
of the general rule against vertical discriminations which they have formulated, the
following decisions can be explained only upon the basis of some unarticulated "rule of
reason." The content of this rule is not known and cannot be derived from considerations
of sound interstate commerce policy; the rule apparently rests upon grounds unrelated
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by harsh burdens of proof so that all but the most blatant discriminations
escape judicial disapproval.
67
to these policy considerations. See, e.g., Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 63,
72-73, 88 (1913), overruled ois other grounds, Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U.S. 203, 218 (1925) ; Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 236 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1945) ;
Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 157 (1918) ; New York . Roberts, 171
U.S. 658 (1898), (Harlan, J., dissenting, 666 at 638) ; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610,
261 (1915); People ex rel. Thurber, Whyland Co. v. Barker, 141 N.Y. 118, 121, 35 N.E.
1073, 1074 (1894); In re Goodwin v. State Tax Commission, 286 App. Div. 694, 146
N.Y.S.2d 172, affd 150 N.Y.S.2d 203, appeal dismissed 352 U.S. 805 (1956); Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Barnett, 200 Miss. 233, 27 So. 2d 60 (1946) (in which a federal
statute designed for the purpose of preserving the states' powers to tax and regulate the
business of insurance was construed to bestow upon the taxing state power to discrimi-
nate vertically against foreign insurance companies); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers,
119 Ohio App. 251, 255-58, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 170, 172-74, 196 N.E.2d 114, 117-18 (1963),
rev'd mee., 33 U.S.L. WEEK 4268 (U.S. far. 15, 1965). And see Dcvelopments in the
Law 964 n. 51. Idaho Compensation Co. v. Hubbard, 70 Idaho 59, 211 P.2d 413 (1949),
may also be read as sustaining a vertical discrimination against a foreign insurance com-
pany, if it is assumed that it was far more likely that local companies would have more
than 50% of their assets invested in taxing-state-based property, and hence would qualify
for lower tax rates. In addition, however, this decision should be reid as sustaining a "deriv-
ative vertical discrimination" - see notes 88-89 ifra and accompanying text - against
foreign issuers of bonds; foreign and domestic taxpayers were encouraged, by the pros-
pect of lower rates, to invest in the bonds of the taxing state rather than those of outside
issuers. Other cases involving such derivative vertical discriminations include Cudahy V.
Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 261 Wis. 126, 52 N.W.2d 467 (1952); Collector of Revenue
v. Hunt, 246 La. 605, 165 So. 2d 843 (1964) ; Sparks v. West Point Mfg. Co., 274 Ala.
102, 145 So. 2d 816 (1962) ; and cf. Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 (1906).
Among the "rule of reason" cases which sustain vertical discriminations are many
in which homage is paid to the traditionally broad power of the states to make classifica-
tions among taxpayers. See Developments in the Law at 958, and citations therein. See.
e.g., Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett. 276 U.S. 245 (1928): Colgate v. Harvey. 296 U.S.
404, 416-22 (1935); General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day. 270 U.S. 367 (1926) ;
the Idaho Compensation Co. case, supra this note; Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Town-
ships of Austin, Millbrook & Hinton, 373 Mich. 123 at 136, 128 NAV.2d 491 at 502 (1954) ;
Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 158 Miss. 753, 771-74, 131 So. 282, 285-86 (1930) (in
which a vertical discrimination against the foreign insurance company was justified on the
ground that the taxing state might reasonably have desired to encourage the development
of local insurers in order to assure the residents reduced costs). That objective could be
accomplished more effectively by permitting foreign and local insurers to compete on
equal terms. And see New York Life Ins. Co. v. State, 192 Wis. 404, 405-06, 211 N.V.
288, 288-89, writ of error dismissed, 276 U.S. 602 (1928). Involved here was a "retaliatory"
statute, which imposed upon foreign insurance companies all taxes applicable to local
ones and, in addition, whatever costs in excess of that amount were imposed by the
foreign insurer's state of incorporation upon insurers incorporated in the taxing state.
While the ostensible function of such statutes is to assure horizontal uniformity as be-
tween the involved states" multistate taxpayers, its necessary effect - within the retali-
ating state - is to discriminate vertically in favor of local taxpayers, as it operates only
to increase the tax burdens of foreign vis-i-vis local taxpayers. Cf. Bel Oil Corp. v. Roland,
242 La. 498, 137 So. 2d 308, appeal dismitssed sub nomm. Bel Oil Corp. v. Cocreham, 371
XU.S. 21 (1962).
67. See notes 71-75 infra and accompanying text. And ci. Wood v. Tawes, 181 Md.
155, 164, 28 A2d 850, 854, cert. denied, 318 U.S. 718 (1942); Luckenbach Steamship Co.
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The court's expansive conception of the realm of reason is indicated by the
"supportable sloppiness" doctrine. Courts have upheld some substantial dis-
criminations on the ground that a degree of "untidiness" is unavoidable with-
in complex state tax structures.68 Judicial willingness to tolerate untidy statutes
seems to evidence a reluctance to force statutory revision on the states, a reluc-
tance unbalanced by concern for the multistate litigator to whom the statute is
more than merely untidy. The interests of interstate commerce are disregarded
even more readily when the state alleges a police power purpose to justify
the discrimination.60 Finally, if a multistate business competes with an un-
identical local business, the state may classify the multistate business in a higher
taxing category than the local competitor. In these cases the courts usually
accept the classification without question."0
The multistate taxpayer must argue against this generous view of "reason-
ableness" under extremely heavy burdens of proof. The courts impose both the
traditional burden on one challenging the validity of state action,71 even if the
state offers no justification,72 and almost impossible burdens on a range of
other issues. The courts may require the taxpayer to exclude the possibility
that some rational excuse might justify the discrimination." When the state
alleges that a discriminatory tax provision is fair when viewed in conjunction
with other tax statutes, most courts demand that the taxpayers prove that the
total effect of the complex of statutes is discriminatory.74 Finally, in cases in-
v. Franchise Tax Board, 33 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548, appeal dismissed 377 U.S. 215 (1964).
Occasionally, however, despite these procedural obstacles, the contesting taxpayer suc-
ceeds. See cases cited supra note 64; in each of these cases, the discrimination appeared
on the face of the taxing statute. But see Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961),
sustaining a vertical discrimination against multistate "freezers."
68. See, e.g., Developments in the Law at 958; General American Tank Car v. Day,
270 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1926). Cf. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 284 (1932);
Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 33 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548, appeal dos-
inssed 377 U.S. 215 (1964).
69. See cases cited stpra note 66. Just as the courts have failed to articulate their
"rule of reason," they have failed to explain on what basis they choose to favor state
regulatory interests over that of freeing multistate taxpayers from vertical discrimination,
though each of these interests is constitutionally grounded.
70. The courts have been willing to sustain classifications discriminating against
multistate taxpayers even in cases where the local competitors were in businesses identical
to those of the multistate taxpayers. See note 66 supra and accompanying text. Where the
competitors' businesses are not identical, the courts have found this dissimilarity between
their products (or services) a convenient basis on which to support differential classifica-
tions between them. See, e.g., A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 43 (1934). Here,
the mere fact that the competing products were not identical was held to sustain the
discrimination, without inquiry into whether any legitimate regulatory purpose existed
to validate differential treatment of dissimilar but competitive products.
71. Cf. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 283 (1932).
72. Id. at 283-84.
73. Ibid.
74. See, e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 419-20 (1935); Interstate Busses Corp.
v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 251 (1928); General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270
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volving unequal application of otherwise valid taxing statutes, a court may re-
quire the multistate taxpayer to prove that the discrimination was intentional 75
It is unclear what accounts for feeble judicial enforcement of the rule against
vertical discrimination, since the courts have never explained their action. It is
dear, though, that the reasons are extrinsic to that rule. Perhaps the courts'
retreat can be explained by their reluctance to make national economic policy
without congressional direction, particularly in deciding which vertical dis-
criminations should be proscribed.70 But whatever the reasons for the courts'
restraint, the consistency of their retreat 77 suggests that Congress must define
the extent to which the courts should strike down vertical discriminations.Y8
In deciding what direction legislative action should take, it is useful to focus
first on the paradigm example of vertical discrimination, where the multistate
business is in direct competition with local businesses, but the state applies dif-
ferential tax rates or differential definitions of effective tax bases.i0 Here, where
U.S. 367, 374 (1926). Cf., O'Connell v. State Board of Equalization. 95 Mont. 91, 119, 25
P.2d 114, 121 (1933). The situation in the General American Tank Car Case illustrates
particularly well the hardship of placing this burden of proof on the contesting taxpayer,
who lacks access to relevant information about the taxes in question.
75. See, e.g., Beeson v. Johns, 124 U.S. 56, 59-60 (1888). Cf., Southern Ry. Co. v.
Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 526 (1923).
76. Cf. HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 11. The courts' undercutting of their general rule
against vertical discriminations may thus indicate a retreat from a judicial economic
policy never politically established, a retreat which leaves the courts no actual standard
for reasoned decision.
77. But see Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 119 Ohio App. 251, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 170,
196 N.E.2d 114 (1963), rev'd mem. 33 U.S.L. VEFX 4268 (U.S. Miar. 15, 1965). Yet a
single silent swallow does not a summer make.
78. In considering action in the area of vertical discrimination, Congress should bear
in mind that its proposed actions to improve compliance and enforceability may bring to
the surface many discriminations which today are merely potential ones, never occurring
because of the frequency of multistate-taxpayer noncompliance. See House RPor, vol.
1, 334.
79. "Direct" competition is here used to denote competition with respect to the same
product (or service). It is to be distinguished from "primary" competition, see note 90
infra and accompanying text, a concept which will be employed to describe competition
between a multistate taxpayer and his major local competitor whose product is dissimilar.
Under the approach to be recommended, the multistate taxpayer's direct local competitors
will be deemed to be his relevant competitors for purposes of determining whether vertical
discrimination exists. The most sizeable of his competitors whose products are dissimilar
will become relevant as primary competitors only where the multistate taxpayer faces
no direct local competition. Where both direct and primary competitors are present,
focusing solely upon the former class is an approach susceptible to abuse; where the
multistate taxpayer is much larger than his direct local competitors, states might attempt
to classify such direct but secondary competitors in higher taxing categories solely in
order to discriminate in favor of the multistate enterprise's primary local competition.
Although a showing of discriminatory intent would presumably invalidate such a tax, it
is arguable that we should abandon the qualitative approach underlying the focus upon
direct competition, and adopt instead a wholly quantitative one, considering in all cases
the multistate taxpayer's relevant local competitors to be those with which the taxpayer
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no problem of classification is present, Congress should reject traditional state
justifications of discrimination and establish a rule that differential treatment
is per se "unreasonable." 80
primarily competes - regardless of whether their competing products arc identical or
dissimilar. (Even if the dichotomy were abandoned in ascertaining relevant local com-
petition, of course, it would remain relevant for determining whether the per se rule now
to be proposed, or the rule of reason proposed at notes 90-94 infra and accompanying
text, should apply.)
However, considerations of administrative feasibility call for retention of the distilc-
tion between direct and primary competition. Developments in the Law at 959-60 notes
the possibility that the courts may be unable to resolve effectively the question of who
one's competitors are - the question central to a policy of vertical uniformity. This
judgment would ultimately justify the use of horizontal uniformity to prevent vertical
discriminations, for this approach would have the advantage of permitting the courts to
bypass this now central question. But Congress should postpone this evaluation of tile
courts until after they have had an opportunity to cope with the issue free from their
self-imposed restraints. Assuming that the courts must cope with the issue, It would
seem desirable, at least for a time, to simplify their task by considering the multistate
taxpayer's relevant local competitors to be his direct competitors, thus avoiding tile
courts' having to grapple with quantitative data on the issue of primary competition. They
would have to employ such data in only two situations: first, where no direct local compe-
tition exists; and second, where both direct and, allegedly, primary competition exist,,
and the multistate taxpayer alleges that a local classification of his direct competitor was
made for the purpose of discriminating in favor of his primary competitor.
In addition, a quantitative approach, unlike the qualitative approach, would focus not
upon a static, but a fluid situation, changes in which are not easily recognized, For ex-
ample, the multistate taxpayer's direct but secondary local competitor might enlarge its
operation to the point at which it becomes the primary competitor as well. Were the
courts to focus solely upon the question of primary competition, it would be necessary
in every litigation to dispense with the principle of finality and substitute for it the rule
that either the taxing state or the multistate taxpayer may subsequently re-open the
question of which state tax is applicable, in light of quantitative changes in the nature of
the multistate taxpayer's primary competition. Under the approach recommended, this
possibility of re-opening the issue of who one's competitors are would exist where resort
in the original case was to primary competition; but decisions relating to direct compe-
titors would be final unless the multistate taxpayer's direct local competition subsequently
left the market.
There is also a problem inherent in a purely quantitative approach beyond that of
administrative infeasibility. If the multistate enterprise were taxed at the level of its
primary local competitors, its secondary local competitors - with whom it directly con-
petes - might suffer a reverse vertical discrimination. But if Congress wished to employ
the quantitative approach whenever both direct and primary competition were present,
it could avoid this incidental problem by requiring that the multistate taxpayer's secon-
dary, direct competitor be taxed at the same level as the multistate taxpayer, which is
by hypothesis its primary as well as direct competitor.
80. Where local and multistate taxpayers directly compete, no classifications of then
in different tax categories should be tolerated, as no differences in their products exist
which could serve as possible ustifications for the differential treatment. But direct conipeti-
tors may operate through different legal forms - e.g., the sole proprietorship and partner-
ship, on the one hand, and the corporation, on the other - and as these are commonly
treated differently for purposes of income taxation, vertical discriminations may result.
Because the choice of form is the multistate taxpayer's and each form affords particular
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The "supportable sloppiness" defense should be rejected; Congress should
not be reluctant to require the states to rationalize their tax structures to the
limited extent necessary to protect multistate competitors. The fact that a dis-
crimination might result from inadvertence rather than a conscious policy is
irrelevant to the primary congressional concern with artificial obstructions to
the development of a national economy. Of course, if the damage complained
of is de ininimis, some degree of "untidiness" may be tolerated. 8' And the per
se rule would not require that all of the relevant taxes be contained in a single
statute. So long as the statutes, when viewed cumulatively, produce substan-
tially equivalent tax burdens, they are unobjectionable. The multistate tax-
payer, however, should not have to bear the burden (which most courts have
imposed upon him) 82 of showing that the effect of the total statutory scheme
is discriminatory. Upon a showing that the particular statute applicable to the
multistate taxpayer is discriminatory on its face, the state, with its superior
access to knowledge about its own statutes,8 3 should bear the burden of show-
ing that such a discrimination is "cured" by other statutory provisions.
Other of the state's general defenses also should be rejected. The taxing state
may argue that the multistate taxpayer receives some benefit justifying a higher
rate. But usually governmental services are conferred equally upon competing
local and multistate taxpayers. Differential treatment should be sustained only
when the multistate taxpayer receives benefits unavailable to his local com-
petitors.84
tax advantages, such discriminations are palatable. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 65-68, 61 A.2d 89, 102-03 (1948) ; but see Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. City of Youngstown, 91 Ohio App. 431, 436-41, 108 N.E.2d 571, at 575-77 (1951).
Of course, no differential treatment of direct competitors operating in the same form
should be tolerated. See also note 84 infra and accompanying text.
81. This defense of de nuinimis, however, should be carefully circumscribed. In evalu-
ating the extent of the multistate taxpayer's damage - i.e., the extent of the vertical
discrimination - the question must not be simply whether the differential cost of the
discrimination is substantial in relation to his overall financial position. It must be, in
addition, whether the differential is significant from the perspective of the relative posi-
tions of the multistate taxpayer and his local competitors.
82. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
83. This imbalance will be reduced to the extent that discovery procedures are avail-
able to the taxpayer. But discovery against state governments may be limited by notions
of "governmental privilege." Cf. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTxcE 803-05 (rev. ed. 1963). More-
over, discovery would not necessarily serve to compel states to inquire into new factual
questions not previously investigated. Finally, most multistate taxpayers are small. HousE
REPORT, vol. 1, 71-75, 90-91. A discovery proceeding which yields for a small taxpayer
only a mass of tax returns and statistics probably does not enable him in any realistic
sense to ascertain, for example, whether his local competition, subjected to different
kinds of taxes, bears equivalent tax burdens. Cf. De'elopments in the Lav at 960.
It should be noted that the allocation of the burdens of proof proposed here and at
text accompanying notes 93-97 infra should be applied regardless of whether the taxing
state (suing to collect its tax) or the multistate taxpayer (suing for a refund) appears
as plaintiff, since the interests involved and the policies applicable remain the same.
84. A progressive rate structure would not affect a vertical discrimination if the
various brackets are applicable equally to local and multistate taxpayers. Cf., Derelopments
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A state's discrimination is equally objectionable when caused by differential
treatment of various deductions.8  For example, to permit a depreciation de-
duction only when the depreciable asset is located within the state confers a
competitive advantage upon local taxpayers to the extent that the operations
of multistate taxpayers are "centered outside the taxing State. . . ."80 The
state's argument that the "reasonable" purpose of such across-the-board dif-
ferential tax treatment is to encourage the location of plant and equipment
within the state is but a confession that its purpose is to distort the allocation
of resources among the states.87 Denial of deductions for contributions to out-
of-state charities, and denial of deductions for dividends received from out-of-
state corporations involve two kinds of vertical discrimination: against the
multistate taxpayer and against the out-of-state charity or corporation."8 These
deduction provisions hurt multistate taxpayers because they are more likely to
donate to foreign charities and invest in foreign corporations than are their
local competitors. These deduction provisions discriminate against the out-of-
in the Law, 958, notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text. But evidence that the brackets
are structured in such a way as to tax a large multistate enterprise disproportionately,
especially if coupled with a showing that the rate structure was altered after the multi-
state business entered the state, would suggest a discriminatory intent - invalidating the
tax in question. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
85. Cf., text accompanying notes 11-12 .supra. See generally HousE REPoRT, vol. 1,
587-88, 251-80 (summarized at 278-80) ; and note the variations in treatment of the ex-
emption for interest on obligations of the taxing and other states, id. at 258. Such dis-
criminations are rooted in essentially parochial state interests. Id. at 276-78.
86. Id. at 588.
87. This would seem to be the only utility of the practice. Id. at 276.
88. Compare id. at 587-88, which does not distinguish between differential treatment
of depreciation deductions and that of deductions for charitable contributions and inter-
corporate dividends with id. at 277-78, which appears to do so. They are distinguishable
in that while both are likely to effect vertical discriminations at the taxpayer level, tie
latter also necessarily effect the kind of derivative vertical discriminations described
above. See Idaho Compensation Co. v. Hubbard, 70 Idaho 59, 211 P2d 413 (1949), dis-
cussed supra note 66, and Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 416-22 (1935), sustaining
such derivative discriminations.
One alleged purpose of denying the deduction for dividends received from out-of-state
corporations not subject to the taxing state's income tax is to "mitigate a form of double
taxation." HousE REPORT, vol. 1, 278. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 416-22 (1935).
It is argued where the paying corporation is not subject to the taxing state's income tax,
there is no double taxation involved - by the taxing slate which grants the deduction -
and hence the deduction should not be available. But if the pre-dividend income of the
paying corporation is subject to income taxation in the state in which it is generated
(as will often be the case, since thirty-seven states plus the District of Columbia
presently levy a corporate income tax, HousE REPoRT, vol. 1, 255-56. notes 1-3), double
taxation nevertheless occurs. If the taxing state is to prevent double taxation with respect
to dividends paid by locally taxed payer corporations, then sound interstate commerce
policy would seem to require a similar result with respect to such payor corporations
subject to income taxation outside the taxing state. See id. at 276, 278. That state's reve-
nue interest should be considered irrelevant in this context, as revenue objectives may be
pursued only in a manner consistent with the policy against vertical discriminations,
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state enterprises as well by encouraging contributions to and investment in their
local competitors.89
While a per se rule is appropriate when the taxing state discriminates be-
tween local and multistate competitors with identical services or products, a
more difficult problem is presented when the competing services or products
are not identical.90 Here a legitimate regulatory purpose"0 might justify the
state in categorizing the multistate business in a higher taxing category than
his major local competitor.9 2 Congress must decide whether the interests of
interstate multistate commerce should be subordinated to the state's interest in
employing its taxing power for regulatory purposes. Congress should qualify
the per se rule in this limited category of cases in order not to undermine state
regulatory schemes. But such deference should be severely restricted. The
state's classification should be permitted only when the state bears the burden
of proving that the higher-taxing statute has a regulatory (as well as a reve-
nue)9 3 purpose, and that the regulatory scheme would be undermined if the
multistate taxpayer were taxed at a lower level.
0 4
89- The proposed congressional action against discriminatory definitions of the tax
base raises more general questions concerning the desirability of state subsidies or tax
breaks for the location of facilities or the undertaking of activities within the state. Even
if a subsidy is made available to local and multistate businesses alike, its function is to
encourage activities or investments within the state which presumably would not be
present in the absence of an artificial inducement. Across-the-board subsidies or tax breaks
made available without respect to the industry involved can serve no proper function;
like tariffs, they operate to misallocate the resources of the national economy for the
sake of parochial state interests. More particularized subsidies or tax breaks might, how-
ever, serve legitimate functions. They may be needed to assure that imperfections of the
market mechanism do not deprive the state or its citizens of particular products or serv-
ices. In most cases these failures call merely for measures to encourage specific industries
to provide their goods or services within the state, without attempting to affect plant
location. Only where the need is for the development of the state's infrastructure may
incentives be conditioned upon location within the state. And in no case may subsidies or
tax breaks be legitimately made available only to local, and not to multistate businesses.
See Miller v. Lamar Life Ins. Co, 158 Miss. 753, 771-74, 131 So. 282, 285-86 (1930),
criticized supra note 66.
90. Here the multistate taxpayer, if he faces local competition at all, faces "primary"
rather than "direct!' competition These terms are defined at note 79 supra.
91. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the state's regulatory purpose
is a reasonable one from the perspective of a wholly domestic case.
92. It should be noted that the "lesser-taxed" category may not be subject to the
particular tax - e.g., a sales tax - at all.
93. Revenue interests alone are of course insufficient to sustain vertical discrimina-
tions. Compare note 88 supra.
94. Compare the mindless approach of the efagnano case, supra note 70. What is
being suggested can best be illustrated by considering a hypothetical case. Assume the
existence of the XYZ Motorscooter Co., Incorporated and having its manufacturing
facilities in State A, but making sales in both States A and B. State B imposes two
sales taxes which might be applicable to XYZ - a lower one applicable to "two-wheel
vehicles," which has applied previously in wholly domestic cases to sales of bicycles,
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Once the multistate taxpayer has produced evidence sufficient to support a
finding that his major local competitor is taxed in the lower category, the risk
of non-persuasion should be upon the state on all issues. It must prove either
that the taxpayer does not compete primarily with those in the lower category,
or that the classification serves a valid regulatory purpose. Imposing the risk
of non-persuasion upon the state is consistent with the policies underlying al-
location of burdens of proof generally. First, this allocation encourages the pro-
duction of evidence concerning regulatory purpose by placing the burden upon
the party with superior access to information95 Second, this allocation avoids
imposing upon the taxpayer the requirement of disproving all conceivable regu.
latory purposes. 96 Finally, the proposed allocation places the risk of non-per-
suasion upon the party whose loss will less seriously affect congressional ob-
jectives if the issue is decided incorrectly.97 Imposing the risk of an erroneous
and a higher one applicable to "motor-operated vehicles," which has similarly been applied
only to sales of automobiles. In the absence of precedent, since XYZ is the first motor-
scooter company, foreign or local, to tap State B's market, State B classifies motor-
scooters as "motor-operated vehicles," and therefore taxes XYZ at tile higher of the
two possible levels. XYZ, however, establishes that despite the slightly higher price
of its product, the major local competition which it faces is from bicycle dealers, State
B does not contest this fact, but argues that the higher tax is applied to motorized vehicles
in order to effectuate an important state policy - to provide additional revenues for the
state's smog-control program. To succeed, State B should have to show that motor-
scooters create exhaust problems which, in amount and in quality, are sufficiently like
those created by automobiles to warrant similar tax treatment.
95. See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENcr 426-27 (4th ed. 1057).
But see McCoRMCx, EVIDENCE 675 (1954). See note 83 sittra and accompanying text, On
the question of primary competition, this general policy has been partially abandoned by
placing only a prima facie burden on the multistate taxpayer; assuming there may be
situations in which the multistate taxpayer's interest lies in introducing only that quan-
tum of evidence necessary to establish a legally sufficient showing on the question of
primary competition, a thoroughly consistent application of this policy would impo.:e the
risk of non-persuasion upon him in order to encourage the production of all the evidence
at his command. But this policy is not an absolute one, and its minor qualification ih
justified by another policy consideration. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
96. Accord, MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 95 at 426 with re-
spect to "negative" burdens of proof. On the issue of primary competition, the state
bears no impossible or negative burden of proof. By showing that the taxpayer primarily
competes with local taxpayers classified in the higher-taxed category or with any local
businesses other than those in the lesser-taxed category, the state may exclude the hy-
pothesis on which the taxpayer's prina facie case is grounded, In contrast, placing the
burden of proof on the issue of regulatory purpose upon the taxpayer, would require 1dm
to refute the possibility that the state was moved by a regulatory purpose.
97. Regarding the issue of regulatory purpose, the judgment that an erroneous
decision would more seriously affect multistate competitors than it would state regula-
tory programs is, of course, a qualitative policy judgment. Regarding the issue of pri-
mary competition, Congress has not yet expressed a concern with single-state vertical
discriminations against local taxpayers. Absent such an interest, the risk of an erroncouq
decision upon this question should be imposed upon the state, representing its local con-
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decision upon the state does not preclude it, after losing on the issue of regu-
latory purpose, from clarifying that purpose in future legislation. A losing tax-
payer gets no such second chance.
petitors, rather than upon the multistate taxpayer. But if Congress were to assert such
an interest, see note 61 supra, there would be a more difficult, and somewhat arbitrary,
decision to be made in allocating this risk. Perhaps the risk might be imposed upon the
state, proceeding from the factual assumption that generally, in making tax classifications,
the states more often seek to protect local from multistate taxpayers titan vice versa.
